Ghosts of Memory: Mournful Performance and the Rhetorical Event of Haunting
(Or: Specters of Occupy)

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What are the cultural barriers against which we struggle when we try to find out about the losses that we are asked not to mourn?
– Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?*

[Q]uick, do whatever is needed to keep the cadaver localized, in a safe place, decomposing right where it was inhumed, or even embalmed!

Following ghosts . . . is about putting life back in where only a vague memory or a bare trace was visible to those who bothered to look . . . to understand the conditions under which a memory was produced in the first place, toward a counter-memory, for the future.
– Avery Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*

*Invocation*

Maintaining now these ghosts of memory—memory as ghost, one forever bound to forgetting, haunting and ephemeral revenant—and with so many to which one might attend. *Plus d’un*. Such spooks are restless, parading the psyche uninvited, listlessly trudging from the waters of oblivion for a visit, ruining the frost-

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ing of life with fingerprints. What force has called out these ghosts? And how will one keep such unsettling invaders occupied? Perhaps they desire recognition of their unending sorrow; perhaps they simply require recollection; perhaps they urge one to just cry—or to cry justly. For as I will explain, many argue that the ghost issues a cry for justice, so clearly what is at stake here is a radically different conception of the spectral than is typical and familiar.

Yet to glean what it is more precisely that this novel variety of ghost desires, it will have been necessary to engage in psychography of a sort, a bit of “automatic writing,” so as to let the ghost convey what it has to say through a rhetorical medium—as I become its automaton. I will thereby strive to show how the ghost of memory is called forth via various rhetorical means, and illustrate how its haunting return constitutes an uncanny performance, one whereby it possesses, occupies a space/place, through its mnestic echo. Quite crucially, it will likewise become apparent how the attempt to give the ghost its stage-time constitutes an attempt to mourn/grieve.1 “Crucially,” because the struggle to mourn and/or grieve is often blocked, occluded, prohibited, even struck down and put to death; for although perhaps not readily apparent, there is quite a lot at stake ethico-politically in the morbid “undertaking” of attending the dead and their desires. Yet one must accept bearing such palls and sorrows if one is to respond to the call for justice that the ghost issues.

I want to begin, then, start listening and responding, via what Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer in “On the Theory of Ghosts” call “[t]he disturbed relationship with the dead” (or lost) that comes about due to blocked mourning (215), and with the non-affirmative form of forgetting brought about by the prohibition of mourning’s/grieving’s rhetorical performance (what Walter Benjamin analyzed in Trauerspiel).2 Continuing with the theme of performance, I will in turn show how not only are attempts to mourn/grieve often prevented outright, they are often disrupted by forces proclaiming—themselves via performative declaration—that those attempting to mourn/grieve are engaged in

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1 Elisabeth Kübler-Ross differentiates between mourning and grief as follows, saying: “Mourning is the external part of loss. It is the actions we take, the rituals and customs. Grief is the internal part of loss, how we feel. The internal work of grief is a process, a journey” (Grieving 115). I will strive to maintain fidelity to this distinction throughout; however, I also maintain that the binary that Kübler-Ross sets up deconstructs due its opposing of “exterior” and “interior” zones.

2 As this investigation proceeds, it will become clear that the most significant prohibitions of mourning/grieving at issue are those that aid in maintaining the hegemony of Capital, those that, as Jacques Derrida notes, operate in “the interest of capital general, an interest that, in the order of the world today, namely the world-wide market, holds a mass of humanity under its yoke and in a new form of slavery” (Specters 117). The question regards how Capital occupies—like an imperial army—mourning/grief so as to “colonize” and dominate them.
rhetorically futile acts, that in essence their causes or undertakings are “dead.” However, as I will also show, such declarations (and their wishes for hegemonic memory and/or obliviousness) produce surprising and unintentional effects, more precisely, that they have the power to conjure the ghost. The ghost at issue here, however, rather than some cliché Halloweenish caricature, is a rhetorical figure for envisioning the haunting force of memory, memory’s indissoluble link to forgetting, the incomplete and incompletable nature of history/ontology (including The History of Rhetoric), and the “empty” and undesignated space/place of justice. Indeed, the ghost aids one in thinking and re-calling a number of forces, and so it is prudent to listen to its frightening call—especially when one would rather run like hell in the opposite direction! Thus the task of the following investigation is to attend the ghost so as to write its counter-memorial narrative, its tale of mourning/grieving with the power to presage the messianic “coming” of justice—an event that never quite arrives or is always on-the-way. So down the dark path one silently goes, pushing through the howling wind, ducking beneath jagged black branches, so as to attend the complex rhetorical relation between memory, ghosts, and justice.

Prohibition

But the way is shut! Although there exists a desire to live on, to learn to live (finally?), the production of mournful memory and its figures is often blocked, whereby mourning’s/grieving’s performances are dragged from the stage. Judith Butler therefore presciently remarks that “[w]hether we are speaking about open grief or outrage, we are talking about affective responses that are highly regulated by regimes of power and sometimes subject to explicit censorship” (Frames 39). Indeed, though there erupt traumatic events that breach one’s world, tear gashes in life, call one (loudly!) to attend them, the fraught performances of mourning/grieving are often restrained and gagged via exercises in radical in-hospitality. Hence David Eng and David Kazanjian understand “mourning [and its mnesic production] as a type of performance that not only exposes the mechanisms of state regulation but also reveals the ways in which state control of bodies materializes a political world of social appropriations” (11). The motives behind such rhetorical prohibitions and regulations become

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3 It is fitting that a rhetorician take up the call to investigate declarations of death if for no other reason than rhetoric itself has been proclaimed dead again and again throughout history. Moreover, I certainly agree with Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen when he notes that “it may be retrospective illusion to speak of the ‘end’ or ‘death’ of rhetoric,” and that “[n]othing prevents one part or another of ancient rhetoric-in-general from surviving, reviving, or simply prospering under another name” (62-63). Perhaps this is all to say that rhetoric as such is a ghost, one that haunts western thought, philosophy, and the aims of foundational ontology.
clearer, however, when it comes to light how “[o]pen grieving is bound up with outrage, and outrage in the face of injustice or indeed of unbearable loss has enormous political potential” (Frames 39). Indeed!—the volcanic pathos of grief/mourning possesses kinetic and kairotic force; it can make one, and in turn one’s communities, powerful through affective and intellectual metamorphosis. (As Proust says: C’est le chagrin qui développe les forces de l’esprit). And when one mourns with others, raising the din of voices to a clamorous roar while attending injustice, a rhetorico-material force is born with the capacity to unsettle worlds. For although “non-violent,” Butler notes, as a political strategy the rhetorical articulation of mourning/grief can manifest as a “carefully crafted ‘fuck you’” to power (182), and in the eyes of said power, such teary-eyed “aggression” will not stand.

Beyond disruptiveness, though, and even “vulgarity,” what more can one say about the performance of grieving/mourning as a political strategy? Why are said performances, productions of mournful memory, so often prohibitively blocked? In Butler’s words: “What might be ‘offensive’ about the public avowal of sorrow and loss such that memorial[ization] would function as offensive speech” (Precarious 35)? (When the bereaved’s veils are pushed into shadows equally as black). For Adorno and Horkheimer, one answer is that neither mourning nor grief have significant productive value to Capital:

The respect for something which has no market value [. namely, the dead, the lost.] . . . is experienced most sharply by the person in mourning, in whose case not even the psychological restoration of labor power is possible. It becomes a wound in civilization, asocial sentimentality, . . . That is why mourning is watered down more than anything else and consciously turned into social formality. (215)

According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the one who performs mourning/grieving directs his or her energies in a way that Capital has difficulty subsuming. And when the subject or ego is “devoted” to mourning, as Freud puts it, this “work” contrasts the “labor” of capitalist production (Cf. Arendt). Thus, mourning/grieving, as temporary stopgaps in production, find themselves formalized and quickly brushed aside. Little wonder—these are Modern Times; the Machine must keep running.

Furthermore, not only does the performance of mourning/grieving have no value in the bright green seductive eyes of Capital unless reappropriated, such forces can disrupt specific socio-economic hierarchies that Capital inherently produces. As Butler points out, “[w]e might think of war as dividing populations into those who are grievable and those who are not” (Frames 38), and this insight applies not only to wars between nation-states/insurgencies, but to class wars as well. Indeed, the class wars internal to Capital’s mechanics produce divisions such that there are significant portions of the populace nationally and globally whose losses are not deemed as grievable (Cf. Victor Vitanza on diacritics) (Neg-
tion 11-12). For instance, if one loses one’s home to foreclosure, becomes bankrupted via student or health debt, finds oneself unemployed, and so on, in the eyes of Capital these are not mournable/grievable loses, they are simply the “natural” outcomes of the most ideal socio-economic arrangement possible. If one performs mourning/grieving in such instances, one is therefore merely exuding self-pity and refusing to take responsibility for one’s work, status, and health. Hence in cases such as those enumerated here, the production of mournful memory is typically blocked, walled up, mummified, and en-crypted.⁴ One is taught to swallow one’s pride and hold back one’s tears; one has only oneself to blame. There is little to mourn or grieve living in the shining city/state of exception—such performances are a melodrama enacted by the petulant, the “complainers,” the suspicious “blame America” crowd.

To restate the argument in different terms, one of the reasons why performances of mourning/grieving are prohibited is that if one inhabits Leibniz’ “best of all possible worlds,” in this case, the professed utopia of neoliberal capitalism, then there rarely exists anything for which to justifiably mourn/grieve. If one has lost, according to the logic of neoliberal Capital, this outcome is not only one’s sole responsibility, but is the heroic risk one takes for having the privilege to participate in an economic contest whereby “everyone” has a chance to succeed. Thus, when Elisabeth Kübler-Ross writes that “[i]n the grieving process, we also need to take time to mourn the life we were supposed to have” (Grief 80), this observation is inherently inimical to the logic of Capital—for there is no other alternative, that is, no better mode of existence. One may have potentially yielded a different life by working harder or smarter within existing socio-economic arrangements, but then according to the same logic, there is no justification for mourning/grieving. In fact, one might even contend that according to the above-logic of Capital, when one fails, one should take pleasure in one’s suffering as it is medicinal. Somewhat like the biblical Job, one suffers and thereby learns humility, patience, and the value of unflagging work. Such is the beneficent grace of the Market’s Invisible Hand—the Holy Spirit of Freedom.

In contrast to the above prohibitive logic, however, what if one dares to engage in the rhetorical performance of mourning/grieving, to traverse the path

⁴ Such rhetorics of mummification and related tropes are inspired by Avital Ronell when she asks: “What happens to the perished Other when mourning is inhibited? The refusal to mourn causes the lost ‘love object’ to be preserved in a crypt like a mummy, maintained as the binding around what is not there. Somewhat like freeze-dried foods, the passageway is sealed off and marked (in the psyche) with the place and date in commemoration” (341). Although here Ronell is talking about the “refusal” to mourn, her insights seem applicable to “prohibitions” against mourning as well. In both cases, the dead or lost one is relegated to a place in the psyche that is walled up or sealed off, unavailable for access. However, after being encrypted for too long, mummies tend to develop the desire for revenge and freeze-dried foods become rather inconsumable!
haunted by traces of the ghost? Or in Butler’s words: “Is there something to be gained from grieving, from tarrying with grief, from remaining exposed to its un bearability” (Precarious 30)? To begin again—and is it not in death and mourning/grieving where everything (re-)begins?—one might aver that the courage to mourn/grieve suspends one within a rigorous hesitation and concomitant reflection contrary to the reactionary desire to dodge or reject the sorrow of loss through action (specifically masculinist violence). And as Butler explains, “[w]hen grieving is something to be feared, our fears can give rise to the impulse to resolve it quickly, to banish it in the name of an action invested with the power to restore the loss or return the world to former order, or to reinvigorate a fantasy that the world formerly was orderly” (29-30). In other words, quite often one faces an impasse wherein one’s possibilities appear to range between mournful reflection and the hyper-masculine attempt to restore the world to its seeming former order. Unfortunately, it is often “easier” and more socio-politically acceptable to try and ease the pain of loss through an action fueled by blind rage, vengeance, and bringing forth more death. Hence, Butler calls one to consider that “[i]f we are interested in arresting cycles of violence to produce less violent outcomes, it is no doubt important to ask, what politically, might be made of grief besides a cry for war” (xii). So although it is crucial not to produce a problematic binary opposition here, one can see at least two rhetorical alternatives forming, more precisely, two performatives: the performative declaration of war and the performance of mourning/grieving. As Wayne Booth proclaims: It’s rhetoric or war! Either way, one cries, but in declaring war, one cries for death and revenge, and in mournful rhetorics, one cries for what has been lost—an “opposition” that simultaneously evokes an “opposition” of genders and/or gender performances as well. (And as will soon become clear, either side of the opposition entails evoking the ghost: either through violence and killing or through a performative conjuration that entails listening for the ghost’s post-mortem pleas, hospitably leaving a place for memory).

Another way in which prohibiting or permitting performances of mourning/grieving functions is with regard to the production of a realm for civic discourse. Or as Butler puts it, “the prohibition on certain forms of public grieving itself constitutes the public sphere on the basis of such a prohibition” (Frames 37). Although I am wary of describing the space produced through permitting or prohibiting performances of mourning/grieving as a “public” space or Haber-

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5 With regard to the desire for war and its relation to death, Kübler-Ross asks: “Is war perhaps nothing else but a need to face death, to conquer and master it, to come out of it alive—a peculiar form of denial of our own mortality” (Death 27)? In other words, she questions whether the lust for war is, for all its masculinist posturing, merely a veiled attempt to justify remaining in denial regarding one’s finitude. She therefore wonders whether “we may achieve peace—our own inner peace as well as peace between nations—by facing and accepting the reality of our own death” (31).
masian “public sphere,” Butler’s point is certainly well-taken. I would only amend her remark by recalling Jenny Edkins’ observation that “the private/public distinction can be overcome in an act of communal mourning” (80). In other words, communal performances of mourning/grieving deconstruct the opposition between the expression of “private” affects and “public” space by giving such affects an intense and politically-taut visibility. And such performances may therefore demand the naming of a “third” (Sophistic) space different from the private and public, namely, a conceptually haunting “commons” wherein neither private ownership nor public control hold sway (Cf. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s subsection “Specters of the Common” in Commonwealth).

Regardless of how civic space is christened, however, Butler notes that it “will be created on the conditions that certain images do not appear [there], certain names of the dead [or lost] are not utterable, certain losses are not avowed as losses, and violence is derealized and diffused” (Frames 37-38). In short, civic space is produced through the performances of mourning/grieving that are allowed to take place there, that through (not) taking place, thereby produce that place/space. Thus, employing Butler’s observations to take up the theme of class war again, one can see how the discourses of US media, for instance, largely exclude images of the impoverished, or those of lower- and middle-class soldiers returning from war in flag-draped caskets. One can likewise see how socio-economic losses bound to foreclosure, debt, health, and unemployment are often withheld from visibility, and the violence of the economic powers that facilitate financial loss along with the violence exercised against those who dare to protest such losses are also excluded. Such performances of mourning/grieving remain held from view, and through their absence produce a space of civic discourse as impoverished as the subjects who largely remain absent from it. Yet when the performance of mourning/grieving is enabled, such rhetorics very often launch one back towards the violence/trauma that initially instigated said mourning, and as Edkins notes, ”the memory of [these] past traumas, [then] returns to haunt the structures of power that instigated the violence in the first place” (59). Indeed, through performing mourning/grief, one often finds oneself “disrupting power” by returning (re-venir) to the scene of the crime (like a ghost), and one may find oneself “swearing” to set time right again in the name of justice.

Mortification

Closely bound to the problematic of blocked mourning/grief, one driven by the desire to prevent political foment and maintain specific social relations of production/power, one finds the rhetorical performative of “mortification”—the declaration of death. In the case of prohibiting mourning/grief, it is a question of preventing memorialization from ever taking place, but in the case of mortification, the issue becomes one of bringing about the end of an already-undertaken
process: a campaign, a movement, a “happening,” and so on. And as I will explain as well, mortification can likewise serve as a stealthy form of mourning/grief prohibition itself, in that it works to kill socio-political processes by (prematurely) declaring them dead, wherein the grief process and mournful productions of memory are christened as DOA.

In order to clarify and complicate the rhetorical performance of mortification, one can turn to Derrida’s insightful observation that, “[i]n short, [mortification] is often a matter of pretending to certify death there where the death certificate is still the performance of an act of war or the impotent gesticulation, the restless dream, of an execution” (Specters 60). In other words, mortification at first appears merely a descriptive claim: something is dead. However, this “mere description” masks the (prescriptive) desire to murder its object via explosive, hollow-tipped rhetorical bullets. The death of the entity at issue is far from guaranteed, it has yet to expire and be “forgotten” in the vulgar sense of oblivion, so one accelerates the decomposition process by declaring that the object at issue has no pulse, or smells and is in need of ritual cleansing. Hence Derrida contends that what is at issue in mortification is to “pretend . . . to declare the death only in order to put to death. . . . [mortification] certifies the death but here it is in order to inflict it . . . . It is effectively a performativ[e] . . . to reassure itself by assuring itself, for nothing is less sure, that what one would like to see dead is indeed dead” (59). In order to halt a certain socio-political process or performance, then, to tenuously assure oneself of its demise, one prematurely imagines the gathering swarm of flies. Moreover, as Derrida notes, mortification regularly occurs in relation to Capital and its perceived adversaries. As it marches forward in lock-stepped cadence, it proclaims dead, dead, dead, everything opposed to its unmatched hegemony (64); it relegates such forces to memory in order to dismiss them.

Along with rhetorical performatives of mortification, I want to tarry momentarily with such utterances’ ties to forgetting and death. For although it seems apparent that one desired outcome of mortification is to shut down performances of mourning/grieving thus relegating them to oblivion, might this funeral “undertaking” have unintended consequences? That is, might the desire to rhetorically (performatively) reclassify certain socio-political forces as dead and forgotten ultimately backfire due to an underestimation of how inextricably intertwined forgetting and memory are with one another? For example, as Avishai

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"On the level of the psyche, which is to say, the already social, Freud argues that “[j]ust as mourning impels the ego to give up the object by declaring the object to be dead and offering the ego the inducement of continuing to live, so does each single struggle of ambivalence loosen the fixation of the libido to the object by disparaging it, denigrating it and even as it were killing it” (“Mourning” 257, emphasis mine). In other words, Freud maintains that mourning itself possesses a sort of agency whereby it performatively commands the ego to release the objects to which it is stubbornly cathedectd."
Margalit notes, “[i]t is pretty clear that just being told to ‘forget it,’ . . . does not quite secure forgetfulness: if anything, it increases the chance of remembering” (56). And not only do forgetting and memory contaminate one another such that they tend to snake around, folding back within one another ouroboros-style, but it is clear that forgetting possesses an affirmative power of its own, one that has been overlooked again and again within western thought/tropes. This obliviousness to beautiful “oblivion” should draw special attention from rhetoricians, too, for as Bradford Vivian notes, “[t]he central problem that preserves the dialectic of life and death as equivalents of memory and forgetting is rhetorical . . . one may employ alternative heuristics in order to identify the positive contributions of forgetting as a mode of public judgment” (38). In other words, forgetting is bound to death, and memory to life, primarily via rhetorical convention, and as such conventions are rhetorical, they are likewise reversible and deconstruct(able). With Vivian, one can therefore highlight the affirmative contributions or effects of forgetting in relation to civic discourse and other critical venues. For as noted by Vivian as well, “forgetting achieves persuasive effect as a rhetorical form—that is, as a speech or language act intended to influence thought, debate, or action in public affairs—not by asking audiences to become literally oblivious about segments of their shared past” (47). In short, in contrast to mnesic liquidation, forgetting can serve as a performative, and has an ethical valence in that it urges one to shed portions of one’s past that may exert a damaging influence upon one’s “present.” This is precisely why as well, that forgetting bears no intrinsic link to injustice (9), and provided its “ghostly” status, may even be precisely that for which justice calls (3). Hence, drawing out the intense and complex bond between the ghosts, “forgetful memory,” haunting, and justice are precisely the tasks that remain for the remainder of the current analysis.

As I hope is becoming clear via my remarks above, attempting to prohibit performances of mourning/grieving, or rhetorically (performatively) mortifying them in the attempt to relegate such forces to realm of the dead and forgotten, stacked amid the various lye-filled ditches of history, is not so easy as it seems. This is not only because those who mourn/grieve exert an often unquenchable affective force, but because the dead/forgotten have power. Indeed, as Derrida notes following Freud, “the dead can often be more powerful than the living” (Specters 60); they exert a rhetorical force on life that, though spectral, produces significant effects. So to put the point slightly differently, consider Derrida’s remark that “the cadaver is perhaps not as dead, as simply dead as the conjuration tries to delude us into believing” (120). That is, despite rhetorical invocations to the contrary, or perhaps precisely brought about by performatives with murder-

7 Vivian writes that, typically, “[f]orgetting [is cast] as memory’s unshakable other, a ghostly counterpart shadowing luminous representations of former experiences (3). Thus it is possible to draw out hidden powers that forgetting possesses due to its link to spectrality.
ous intent, as Diane Davis notes, “the one I kill is never quite dead enough” (82). The dead one (Der Tote) returns to haunt!

Exorcism

When introducing what Joshua Gunn calls “the idiom of haunting,” a poetic series of rhetorical figures for thinking and complicating an investigation into performance and the production of mournful memory, it is important to mention straightaway that, as he explains, “haunting in general is a common experience in our lives that has little to do with superstition or the paranormal. Rather, haunting is a psychic force motivating performances that attempt to mourn” (“Haunting” 93). In other words, everyone is haunted by someone or something; everyone senses the peculiar “presence/absence” of that which they have lost, whether it is a loved one, a material object, a shattered ideal, or whatever. Thus Avery Gordon echoes Gunn, maintaining that “[h]aunting is a constituent element of modern social life. It is neither pre-modern superstition nor individual psychosis; it is a generalizable social phenomenon of great import” (7).

One of the most significant (rhetorical) consequences of haunting’s “everydayness” is that the attempt to evict memories from either the psyche or sociopolitical realm are often futile; they leave behind a mnesic trace that is difficult to expunge. Hence, as Gunn succinctly puts it, “[e]xorcism is futile” (“Haunting” 109). Every performative shot from one’s lips/pen/keyboard fails to send the ghost packing. And indeed, “send packing” is precisely what one usually desires to do with ghosts, for they are typically disruptive and terrifying in that they reveal the utter lack of control that one possesses over what “possesses” one’s thoughts and experiences. That is, the ghost is often an imperialist, occupying one’s psyche like an unwelcome army (or soldiers of the unconscious that, as Nietzsche remarks, return to “disturb . . . the peace of a later moment”) (Untimely 61). Thus, as Derrida explains, “[a]s soon as there is some specter, hospitality and exclusion go together. One is only occupied with ghosts by being occupied with exorcising them, kicking them out the door” (Note the trope of occupatio) (Specters 176). One critical thing to highlight here, though, is that one has always already been hospitable to the ghost(s); it has silently crossed the threshold and set up camp in the psyche or civic sphere, ready to disrupt/compel one’s life

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8 With regard to the “common-ness” of haunting, Kübler-Ross notes “[t]here are many types of hauntings, such as sounds you hear, people you see, words that echo, and even the physical sensation of being touched” (Grief 55). Each of these occurrences I would describe as highlighting the (ghostly) power of memory/forgetting.

9 In describing the ghost’s “ontological” status, Derrida writes that it occupies the “space” “beyond the opposition between presence and non-presence, actuality and inactuality, life and non-life” (Specters 15). In other words, the figure of the ghost is one with the power to trouble ontology as such.
and behavior despite one’s wishes to the contrary. Ghosts are master rhetoricians, and often do not wait for an invitation.

However, despite the unsettling “visitations” of the spectral, the affective turmoil that such memories succeed in inducing, is there is an/other way of attending ghosts that resists the desire to have done with them? If so, it is an approach worth inclining towards if for no other reason than “having done” with the ghost (of memory) is practically impossible. For indeed, as Derrida points out, ghostly memories have the spectral capacity to defy borders: “they pass through walls, these revenants, day and night, they trick consciousness and skip generations” (36). The ghost of memory returns in always-untimely fashion, distorting time, leaping through it to haunt, turning over life’s furniture when one least expects it! However, if one resists the urge to call up Winston, Ray, Peter, and Egon to dispense with one’s unpleasant guests, that is, if one resists attempting to purge from the psyche/civic that which returns to cajole it, something may be gained such as in the task of tarrying with mourning. Indeed, what else can tarrying with mourning mean than withstanding the urge to exorcise the ghost? So again, the question of ethics revisits at this fateful juncture, like a familiar, and Gunn therefore argues that “the purchase of haunting is ultimately an ethical one, a commitment toward the other or alterity that hesitates administering last rights—the claim to truth and final ends—in favor of an openness to surprise, to what a given ghost has to say” (97). And again, it is a question of rhetorical performatives, and in this case, of resisting the impulse to prematurely speed the ghost away. Indeed, by refusing to performatively administer rights, to claim to know, to claim to remember (figure) who/what has died or been lost so that one might be at peace, what is at issue is tarrying with the ghost so as to listen to it, like a scholar. By admitting the ghost, here for a second time, one ethically resists foreclosing on memory.10

The monumental significance of this task of admitting the ghost (again—yes, yes), of showing it hospitality despite one’s fears, really comes to the fore when one applies the imperative to the interwoven realms of the historical and ontological. For as Gordon points out, “[t]o write stories concerning exclusions and invisibilities is to write ghost stories” (17). For example, with regard to The History of Rhetoric, in order to write historiographies that pull the forgotten/forgetfully remembered back onto the scene, invite it to speak, this undertaking must be preceded by a kind of performative “conjuration” or séance that attempts to communicate with the dead and lost. And as Victor Vitanza notes

10 With regard to foreclosing on mournful memory, Gilles Deleuze asks: “Is it not true that the only dead who return are those whom one has buried too quickly and too deeply, without paying them the necessary respect, and that remorse testifies less to an excess of memory than to a powerlessness or to a failure in the working through of a memory” (Difference 15)? In other words, it is precisely the attempt to prematurely shut down the mnesic ‘working-through’ of mourning that seems to invite the ghost to return.
(creepily), “[w]hile the living have their needs, the dead (rhetoric[s]?). still have their desires”; for such rhetorics possess a sort of agency and continue to exert a compelling, suasive force (Negation 2). So once one has attuned to such desires, once one has “established contact,” as the figure goes, one often finds oneself in a position to produce a counter-memorial narrative regarding rhetorical history, and this history is effectively a ghost story. Indeed, “historie(s)” of “rhetoric(s)”—major emphasis on the (s)—are inherently ghost stories due to their plural or multiple nature; they involve running around the archives in the dark with ultraviolet light, listening for strange noises. Though, perhaps rather than merely scare one to death, these stories attempt to do justice to a particular force, to respond to justice’s whispered imperative to call the missing out from the hinterlands of History.

One can still go farther. For not only does the figure of the ghost provide one the conceptual/rhetorical resources to think the task of performatively conjuring those forces that have been lost to history, the ghost radically disrupts what it means to write altogether. For the ghost whispers the chilling secret that all history and ontology are brought into being by way of instituting rhetorical performatives. History and ontology are therefore (contingent) conjurations that leave over an excess that forever limns and haunts any professed scholarly hegemony. As Derrida explains, “it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of the concept . . . That is what we would be calling here a hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration” (Specters 202). For Derrida, then, every concept, every ontology (conceptual apparatus/machine), every history is haunted by that for which it cannot account; it is inevitably haunted by its own finitude. Hence the pun, the paraconcept of haunt-ology, for every attempt to definitively determine what is, whether with regard to Being, History, or whatever, is troubled by its ghosts. This is why Gunn writes that hauntology serves “as a haunting reminder that we can never completely reckon with the past, nor secure the future” (“Haunting” 83).

Continuing to unpack the ghost’s implications for rhetoric, the above contentions likewise entail that, if they are the contingent productions of rhetorical

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11 Extending the figure of haunting further into affirmative territory, Gordon explains how “conjuring is a particular form of calling up and calling out the forces that make things what they are in order to fix and transform a troubling situation” (22). In other words, one can imagine actively summoning the ghost in order to set something right that has gone awry.

12 Indeed, ontology and (rhetorical) history can only lay claim to hegemonic mastery over their various subjects by way of “exorcising” the ghosts for which they cannot account: hence, “[h]aunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony” (Specters 46). In other words, for ontology and history to function, they must performatively cast out their ghosts—the power of Geist compels you!
instituting, ontology and history are *figural*—just as the ghost itself functions as a figure.\(^{15}\) But the ghost is no ordinary figure. For as Derrida maintains, “the figure of the ghost is not just one figure among others. It is perhaps the hidden figure of all figures. For this reason it would perhaps no longer figure as one tropological weapon among others. There would be no meta-rhetoric of the ghost” (78). In other words, if one ditches ontology for hauntology (philosophy for thinking?), history for haunted historiography, conceding one’s work consists in producing rhetorical figures of History and Being, then one must likewise concede that these figures are haunted by ghosts for which they cannot account. “Behind” every performative instituting of ontology or history, “behind” the figures that result from such instituting, lurks the meta-figure of the ghost—blinding red light and earthquakes, breathing walls, overturned pots and mangled dogs. The house of Being has got a haint in it! However, when one resists the urge to run like mad when the ghost appears (when it cajoles), as Gordon explains, “the ghost can lead you toward what has been missing, which is sometimes everything” (58). And that “everything” is quite often a memory (a counter-memory), or a call to affirmatively forget—it is a memory that captivates, enthralls, possesses, *occupies*. The ghost is the ultimate “occupier” of memory (its unwitting *hôte*), and it occupies due precisely to what it maintains the memory/forgetting of: a “future” justice that is always to come. So in order to attend such justice, it is necessary to continue pursuing the ghost.

**Case Study**

In order to further outline the problematics of performativity as well as their relation to hauntling, I turn now to a case study that I hope will aid in keeping one on the path towards reckoning with such forces. Looking ahead, I want to apply the previous analyses to three different facets of the Occupy Movement: the “grievances” offered up by the movement in its definitive statements followed by the eviction of activists from so-called “public” space, the subsequent media declarations that proclaimed Occupy dead, and the “nature” or “status” of places/spaces that Occupy now haunts in absentia. The *demand*, however, to which this theoretical application will strive to respond is one relating to the call of justice, more specifically, a justice that is always *on the way*, always *to come*, arriving, what Derrida has called “the messianic.”

To begin (again), I want to return to the question concerning the prohibition of mourning/grieving and the concrete shape that such problematic occlusions can take. Recall, as Butler points out, open or “visible” grieving bound to rage in the face of injustice has significant political power (*Frames* 39), and this is

\(^{15}\) With Derrida, Gordon points out the tropological nature of the ghost, saying: “the ghost is just the sign, or the empirical evidence, if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking place. The ghost is not simply a dead or missing person, but a social figure” (8).
precisely why expressions of grief are intensely monitored and regulated, even outright gagged and censored by regimes of power (39). I contend that the Occupy Movement serves as an exemplar of such open grieving/mourning being subject to draconian regulation and silencing. Indeed, how else might one better characterize the explosive affective displays of those protesting home-foreclosure, the corruption of democracy by moneyed interests, the degeneration of workers’ rights, the crushing educational and health debt faced by so many, than as mourning/grieving such a state of affairs? In fact, in the eloquent “Declaration of the Occupation of New York City,” composed by Occupy Wall Street itself,14 the aforementioned protestations along with many others are characterized rather notably as grievances (N.p.). To state it unwaveringly, then: Occupy was (and is) mourning/grieving the socio-economic state of affairs faced by the majority of the US and world populace. Occupy stands as a national and global performance of mourning. It thereby operates in fashions akin to Benjamin’s Trauerspiele,15 and recalls Douglas Crimp’s passionate call for mourning and militancy (18). Furthermore, this mournful performance likewise involves the struggle to rhetorically/performatively institute a series of losses as grievable, and as worthy of figuration in collective memory. However, this task is not so simple, for as Butler reminds her readers, war divides populations and their losses into those that are grievable and un-grievable, and class war is no exception. For instead of being understood as “authentic” expressions of grieving/mourning worthy of attention and action, many respond(ed) to Occupy with derision, with the attitude that the protests contained not attention-worthy grievances, but instead, mere incoherent and unorganized “complaints.” (Evidence that in the US and elsewhere, the rhetorical strategy of grieving/mourning is problematically misunderstood or dismissed as illogical, overly feminine, futile, and worthy of dismissal).

Then again, there are those who know better, and who realize the significant and effective (affective) force behind the performative strategies of mourning/grieving, and so when mere dismissal, the rhetorical brush-off, is not enough, prohibition often takes the shape of physical violence. In the case of Occupy, as journalist Naomi Wolf notes, this physical violence manifested as a massive/violent nationwide/worldwide crackdown orchestrated by the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, local police, and even multinational banks that were themselves the direct targets of protest (N.p.). The “fuck you” to power

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14 Many other Occupy satellites across the US and around the world produced similar “grievance” declarations.

15 As Butler notes, Benjamin’s Trauerspiele function by “bringing bodies to the foreground,” and by registering loss “as a certain motion of bodies, as if telling is supplanted by moving, and [where] moving, which has no direction and is motivated by no causality, becomes its own kind of display” (Eng 470). Activism often operates in similar fashion by bringing singular bodies into view, displaying them in the mode of performance.
that Occupy extolled was met in turn with: “erase you,” “destroy you,” “forget you,” and one outcome of this violent erasure (and desire for selective remembering), as suggested earlier, is that it significantly re-shaped the space or site of civic discourse. For where at its ecstatic apex Occupy held enraptured a significant portion of the country, turning conversation from the national debt to economic injustice, the radical inequalities produced by the American brand of neoliberal capitalism, after the evictions from both so-called “public” space and the airwaves, the territory of civic discourse was again re-territorialized by the colossus of hegemonic Capital. The images of mourning/grieving disappeared, the losses no longer held sway as losses, and the violence of the evictions was, in Butler’s chilling words, “derealized and diffused” (Precarious 57-38). (Move along folks, there is nothing to grieve here).

But even that was not enough. After the numerous evictions of Occupy across the country and around the globe, the performance of grieving/mourning that had been activated had to be eliminated for good. And the rhetorical weapon of choice in said elimination was mediatic mortification, innumerable (performative) declarations of death. Indeed, to prevent Occupy from continuing to set up camp in the national memory and cultural imagination, not only was it necessary to remove the protests from “visibility,” enact their forgetting (as liquidation or selective remembering), but the movement was proclaimed “dead” again and again. But here is where the story becomes really interesting, and where it may be that a series of unintended consequences ensued, for as already noted, “the one I kill is never dead enough” and forgetting possesses an unimaginable affirmative power. Moreover, upon the traumatic event of death/loss, the work of mournful memory formation commences, calling to (and conjuring up) the ghost, the harbinger of justice.

To provide a sense of the extent to which the media deployed the performative of mortification in the wake of Occupy’s evictions, I reproduce here the following (incomplete) list of titles from various journalistic outlets regarding Occupy’s demise:

"Is Occupy Wall Street Dead?" The Blaze
"Is the Occupy Movement Dead?" CBS Boston
"Is Occupy Wall Street Dead?" Common Dreams
"Is Occupy Dead?" The Daily Bell
"Occupy is Dead; Long Live Occupy" dailykos
"Occupy Wall Street: Dead in 213 Days" The Fix
"Death by Fairy Tale: After Occupy, The 99% Spring ‘Fizzle’" Forbes
"Occupy is Dead! Long Live Occupy!" The Nation
"Why Occupy Isn’t Dead Yet" The Neoprogressive

16 Recall that in psychoanalysis, “eviction” signals an expurgation from consciousness and available (preconscious) memory.
Taking stock of this list of titles, at least three rhetorical trends appear: the open question as to whether the Occupy Movement is/was dead, the recognition and simultaneous affirmation of Occupy’s death, and finally, venomous declarations of death that harbored, worm-in-the-fruit-style, the wish that Occupy would die (as in Forbes and The Wall Street Journal). It is this last type of performative utterance/inscription that I am primarily concerned with at this juncture, as they typify what Derrida points to with his notion of “reassuring” statements that “declare death only in order to put to death” (Specters 59); they are discursive “act[s] of war,” futile attempts at “execution” (60). And some rhetorical efforts at mortification went even further, as did The Blaze’s commentator Buck Sexton, who performed a televised eulogy for Occupy entitled “Occupy Requiem” (N.p.), a caustic segment wherein he stated that he “came to bury Occupy”17 and contended that “[y]ou may not be able to stop a message, but you can forget about it” (N.p.).18

Of course, it is not surprising that opponents of Occupy would employ the above strategies. Neoliberal Capital and its slavish acolytes employ any weapon they can wield in the service of preserving the unchallenged dominance and hegemony of deregulated markets. And certainly, enemy Number One is a certain specter, a ghost that whispers (recalls) that capitalism is a contingent and historical production, only a particular mode of production that does not possess the glimmer of the Eternal, a mode that has been preceded by other modes and will likewise be followed by them. Thus, as Derrida puts it:

Perhaps people are no longer afraid of Marxists, but they are still afraid of certain non-Marxists who have not renounced Marx’s inheritance, crypto-Marxists, pseudo- or para-Marxists” who would be standing by to change the guard, but behind features or quotation marks that the anxious experts or anti-communism are not trained to unmask. (Specters 62)

This is not to suggest that Occupy is a communist or even pseudo-communist movement; if anything, its overarching concern is/was with protecting “the

17 Sexton also glibly added that “[he] would give [Occupy] a burial at sea, but apparently many [Occupiers] have an aversion to bathing” (N.p.).
18 As Butler remarks (in keeping with my observations above on the unintentional effects of performatives of mortification), “I think we have to ask, again and again, how the obituary functions as the instrument by which grievability is publically distributed. It is the means by which a life becomes, or fails to become, a publically grievable life, an icon for national self-recognition, the means by which a life becomes note-worthy. As a result, we have to consider the obituary as an act of nation-building” (Frames 54).
commons."^{19} But that is not the point. The point regards how Occupy is and has been perceived or rhetorically inscribed/recalled, and within the context of the current investigation, how/why it has been assailed via performative rhetorical means as an enemy. Moreover, the question that I want to continue to raise is whether such performatives have the effects that their utterers/writers intend, given that mortification speeds the production of mournful memory via forcibly initiating the mourning/grieving process. For as I have already pointed out, the injunction to forget often produces precisely the “opposite” effect to that of obliviousness, a recalcitrant “stickiness” in memory and the conjuration of ghosts. Permit me to “conclude,” then (or conclude in a manner resisting conclusions, without final solutions), by way of deploying Occupy to rethink forgetting, the ghost, and the *coming* of justice.

So here it comes: for the sake of argument, I proclaim the Occupy Movement dead. As a doornail. Right here in print. Bloated and rotten, soon to be forgotten. Perhaps already forgotten. Decomposition is setting in, maggots are crawling. The squares and parks are long-empty, the music completely silent (save a few die-hards here and there, Internet junkies). Move on. Back to work—as if you ever had a job!

But it is not so simple. For as Derrida, Davis, Freud, Gunn, Gordon, and others have pointed out, the dead are not so dead, and in fact, may possess greater (rhetorical) force on memory than the living—*occupying* memory in a manner far “superior” to the living, consuming one’s psyche via traumatic repetition and return. So where does this leave one?—perhaps returning to the scene of the crime, *to the clearing*, following the sound of drums and the clamor of voices bickering loudly about how to change the world. (The noisy performance of democracy and concomitant quest for socio-economic justice^{20}). And yet what does one find? *Nothing but empty space*. Re-memory is apparently playing cruel tricks. Then again, maybe one is on to something in following this ghost, *these specters of Occupy*, especially if one is in search of certain “spirits” that belong to it

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^{19} As Slavoj Žižek explains regarding the link between Occupy and communism, “[t]he [Occupy] protesters are not communists, if Communism refers to the system which deservedly collapsed in 1990. The only sense in which they are communists is that they care about the commons—the commons of nature, of knowledge—which are threatened by the system” (*Year 83*).

^{20} Regarding socio-economic justice and the ghost, Gordon explains how “haunting is *also* the mode by which the middle class, in particular, needs to encounter something you cannot just ignore, or understand at a distance, or ‘explain away’ by stripping it of all its magical power; something whose seemingly self-evident repugnance you cannot just rhetorically throw in someone’s face” (131). What Gordon seems to suggest here is that the middle class might undergo being haunted by the violence of capitalism, and that it is not enough simply to dismiss the experience of said haunting by dismissing it via hollow *topoi*. 
and there are many, from the jubilance of the parks to the infamous Black Bloc). Hence, back to Gordon: “If you let it, the ghost can lead you toward what has been missing, which is sometimes everything” (58).

Would you like to hear a ghost story, then?

In order to tell it, it is necessary to return to a certain place/space, for as Thomas Rickert notes, “any haunting requires embodiment and emplacement, or a residence and an abode. In other words, haunting, by conjoining the spectral and the material, still requires sites of actualization as incarnation, embodiment, and emplacement” (101). In other words, the ghost needs a place, a stage whereupon to manifest or to perform. In order to attend to Occupy’s ghost, then, these specters, these revenants, to open my memory to them, to allow them to occupy it, it will have been necessary to “stand” in the empty squares, the parks, in front of the vacant city halls and silent business districts. Waiting… And W.J.T. Mitchell explains why, contending that “empty space and the specific place where the major events . . . occurred [are their] true monument” (17). For Mitchell, empty space is not so empty; it possesses a memorial/monumental quality. Memory remains (dwells) in such seemingly empty spaces, though it is shifty, ephemeral in its ontological orientation—yet exerts a rhetorical pull, especially on writing history. Or as Gordon explains, the ghost “makes its mark by being there and not there at the same time” (6). The ghost still continues to perform after death, especially if one dares to rhetorically, performatively call it out via séance, thereby troubling the opposition between subject and object, matter and memory. Are these specters of Occupy merely in my head? Are they still “out there” waiting? Specific places call them forth, but I cannot touch them! This is precisely why Mitchell contends that:

[...] the empty space then is haunted, populated by spirits that refuse to rest, collective and individual memories, a perception that leads toward an opposite reading of the empty space, a transformation of it into a sign of potentiality, possibility, and plenitude, a democracy not yet realized. (21)

Indeed, like an idea, you cannot evict a memory so easily; it holds on, stubborn as poltergeist-like static on television. No wonder it is foolhardy to believe one is ever done with trauma, mourning, and/or loss. The other comes back, sometimes crying for justice. Hence Derrida contends, “no ethics, no politics, . . . seems

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21 As Michael Bernard-Donals explains, the relation between history and memory is “a relation between what has been retrieved and what is lost to retrieval and yet which haunts it incessantly” (161). The question regards those performances that continue to occupy memory (“forgetfully”) by limning History’s barbed-wire margins.

22 Elizabethada Wright makes an observation similar to Mitchell’s when she explains how “[c]emeteries seem silent, yet cemeteries are as silent as they are not. If one sees cemeteries as a rhetorical space, then there are thousands upon thousands of voices clamoring to be heard, a cacophony of remembrances are calling out” (N.p.).
possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet there” (xviii), for example, “there” in the squares, the parks, *The History of Rhetoric*. In fact, the “there” may no longer exist; there may be no “place” remaining, and yet something can remain nonetheless. For as Butler notes: “Places are lost—destroyed, vacated, barred—but then there is some new place, and it is not the first, never can be the first. And so there is an impossibility housed at the site of this new place,” even as this new place relates to an “enigmatic trace” and “animating absence” with regard to the first. (It is thus an aporetic operation: the impossible “place” of a place without place) (Eng 468).

Hence, because they never manifestly occupy place/History, the haunting return of specific rhetorical forces and any calls for justice that they issue never fully arrive; their coming is one forever and always on-the-way. And it may even be, however disturbing this sounds, that this is the first time such a ghostly other has ever come—that in coming to occupy memory as what it cannot contain, the other (as ghost) makes its first “appearance” as other, though precisely by not appearing, but instead, cajoling. For example, perhaps one only begins to attend Occupy by recalling its performance(s) and in realizing that they shatter and defy recollection. The figure of Occupy is troubled and haunted by its metfigural ghosts, just as any History attempting to appropriate the movement inevitably leaves a glaring mnesic excess—“[s]o it would be necessary to learn spirits” (*Specters* xvii). But don’t be fooled. Learning spirits has nothing to do with mastery, especially in this case. What, then, is the one demand? As I will attempt to show, if the ghost leads one on the way to justice, the task is to re-call justice incessantly. For one will never “possess” justice, such that one might deliver it pre-packaged and drop it like supposedly “smart” bombs on unsuspecting civilians in far-away lands. Justice is no one’s to give—“it is always to come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come back” (48). The kairotic moment of justice is forever held in suspension, a taut and quivering bow whose arrow is never fired.

Permit this thought to occupy memory for just a “moment.” The kairotic opening that calls one to attend to it here is noteworthy and worth tarrying alongside. Derrida calls such an instant “messianic”—though it is “atheological” and without messianism—since it is always expected and yet never arrives, or is always-already arriving and is therefore innately unexpected and unexpectable (211). Ghosts apparently really dig gerunds. And because one cannot possibly know when the ghost will arrive, when the harbinger of justice will come, “one must leave an empty place, always, in memory of the hope” that the familiar will return (81-82, emphasis mine). To attend the ghost, and justice (always arriving),
one must hold memory open, the vulnerable gesture of hospitality\textsuperscript{25} and courageous yes-saying, occupying memory with an “empty” space uncannily akin to the numerous once-Occupied squares, districts, and city halls around the nation and world. Moreover, such observations suggest that whenever someone deigns to possess justice, to have mastered it and is capable of delivering it, one must affirmatively forget and shed such pretensions! Justice haunts or “is not.” Justice makes no specific demands, has no particular deliverable content, and thus designates the limits of rhetorical performance and mnesic figuration.\textsuperscript{24}

If one is to follow ghosts and the call for justice they issue, then, one will have to resign oneself to an incessant search, a never-ending quest, as justice forever withdraws into the future. This is why Derrida contends that “[i]f he [or she] loves justice at least, the ‘scholar’ of the future, the ‘intellectual’ of tomorrow should learn it from the ghost” (221). And as always Derrida is playing, since only a scholar situating him or herself in the future or tomorrow is in a position to learn spirits. Only a scholar or intellectual who allows justice to hospitably, courageously occupy memory \textit{from the future} stands a chance of “success.” Only then might one be capable, as Gordon puts it, of breathing life back into a situation in place of vague mnesic traces, catalyze the seismic movement that unsettles History through the tremor of memory (22). Only then is counter-memory, a “forgetful memory” \textit{from the future}, on its way (22). For it is when one leaves (future) memory open, hospitable to surprise, to the ghost, that one is on the way to “becoming just.” And it is alright if it takes “forever” for the messianic ghost to arrive, because the ghost never dies (\textit{Specters} 123), its every performance echoes, and perhaps resonates most loudly in the “emptiest” of places/spaces, the vacated squares and parks of the world.\textsuperscript{25}

Perhaps the ghost just “is” the performative echo as such, its eternal return (not the circle of Zarathustra’s dwarf but a radiant spiral, ripples brought about by a life’s movement, its investments), the intangible—which is to say “forgotten”—material effects upon (within) the world produced by those who stood up, and for a time dared to, crying justice, \textit{occupy memory}.

\textsuperscript{25} Derrida suggests that via certain gestures one might performatively transmute ghosts from revenants into simply “other arrivants to whom a hospitable memory or promise must offer welcome—without certainty, ever, that they present themselves as such. Not in order to grant them the right in this sense but out of a concern for justice” (220).

\textsuperscript{24} The spectral quality of memory leads Gordon to conclude that “we are left to insist on our need to reckon with haunting as prerequisite for sensuous knowledge and to ponder the paradox of providing hospitable memory for ghosts \textit{out of a concern for justice}” (60).

\textsuperscript{25} Given the notion of a performative echo, it becomes easier to understand why Butler contends that “I do not think we have only to mourn the loss of Zuccotti Park or other public places where Occupy was dwelling” (\textit{Demands} 11), and likewise that, “[t]he rituals of mourning are sites of merriment” (Eng 474). Indeed, the question at issue becomes one of non-positively affirming events of loss.
Works Cited


